PROBLEMS OF THE OPTIMAL USE OF ECONOMIC POLICY INSTRUMENTS by Gvelesiani, Revaz
ECOFORUM 
[Volume 10, Issue 2(25), 2021] 
 
PROBLEMS OF THE OPTIMAL USE OF ECONOMIC POLICY INSTRUMENTS  
 
Revaz GVELESIANI,   




In order to make a rational decision in the economic policy, it is necessary to examine and understand  importance 
of the conformist  tools towards the goals. This should be done for a whole  system of goals, including the ones  
which are recognized as core values. In order to reduce the costs associated with the  decision-making,  a certain 
criterion is needed that will facilitate the evaluation. We also need to explore which tools are allowed to address a 
particular problem under the economic policy program. Such a program is a concept of economic policy. It provides 
us with sufficient and unambiguous information on substantive and politically significant consensus. It is a  
consensus that implies that the economy, as an integral part of a more inclusive system of public goals, has a 
subordinate place and, just this condition determines its value. Considering this circumstance, it becomes easier to 
determine whether a goal is  characterized by conformity  to the system.  Conformity to the system is the criterion, by 
which it is measured, what is the main thing in the given concept of the economic policy.  
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         I. INTRODUCTION 
 
         In the process of seeking economic policy measures that should avoid deviation  from the set goal, it is first 
necessary to examine how importantly  the expected outcome is related directly  to the economic policy goals. In line 
with the goal, we must consider conformed all the measures that are appropriate to solving the problem of economic 
policy. 
         The use of the conformity criterion to the objective only allows us to have a single (undifferentiated) view of 
how effective the measures are.   
         The criterion of conformity to a concept or system allows only a preliminary reasoning on the basis of which 
conform measures towards a goal can also be chosen only in advance (Tuchtfeldt, 1982). 
         A right choice of measures requires more multifaceted and differentiated reasoning. It is therefore necessary to 
evaluate the use of the instruments. Assessment of the instruments will be possible if we compare the expected 
benefits and costs of economic policy in relation to a particular measure. 
         In terms of solving a specific problem of economic policy, it will be necessary to identify the measure that can 
bring the most common benefits compared to other measures.In terms of solving a specific problem of economic 
policy, it will be necessary to identify the measure that can bring the most common benefits compared to other 
measures. 
         Economic-and-political analysis of the both costs and benefits will be possible if the following two problems 
are solved: 
Assessment of both key and accompanying impacts implies appropriate knowledge of  management knowledge 
(knowledge problem); 
 The decision-making body shall be required to assess the expected impacts (assessment problem). 
 
         II. METHODOLOGY  
 
         Both general and specific research methods were used in this article, namely – the methods of analysis, 
synthesis, historical, logical, induction, deduction, scientific abstraction, comparative analysis, statistics (selection, 
grouping, observation, dynamics, etc.), static, as well as the methods of experimental evaluation.  
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         III. RESULTS  
 
         Before overcoming the problem of knowledge, it is necessary to explain the problem of economic-and-political 
decision-making, which seems to be solved easier by analyzing the costs and benefits. Such problems are related to 
operationalization. It is important to analyze the costs associated with conformity to the purpose and concept, their 
impact and use, once the goals have been specified. Before discussing them, it is necessary to explain the issues 
related to asset management. These include: checking the dosage of the selected tools, as well as assessing the 
dangers of dosing-related errors. 
         Approaching the goal will also allow us to assess  its both positive and negative  impact on other goals. At the 
same time it is impossible to conduct a scientific analysis of assessments. Only evidence can be substantiated 
scientifically both about the realization of the set goal and the impact of the tools used. We speak here about 
assessing the extent to which a particular measure increases or decreases the ability to achieve a set goal. To do this, 
we must use the knowledge of what impact the instrument used can have on the goal. Assessments made by the 
economic policy makers are usually manifested in political antipathies or sympathies towards certain parties and 
groups of interest. Opposition to economic policy measures may delay decision-making, for example, when 
economic policy bodies seek the consent of Parliament. Delays in the economic policy-related decisions are usually 
reflected in the forms of impact of the measures.  
         The problems related to knowledge and assessment clearly indicates that a cost-benefit analysis of the 
economic policy will be incomplete at best. Such an analysis has both cognitive and pragmatic significance: it 
provides methodological assistance in identifying and correctly assessing a specific problem of management. 
A prerequisite for evaluating a particular measure is to know what impact it (the tool) will have in case of dosed use. 
Just due to the basis of this knowledge it becomes possible to identify and assess the major and accompanying, as 
well as the short-term and long-term impacts caused by the measure.  In most cases, the cost of using the tools also 
depends on the dosage of their use. 
         The effect of  use of the tools relates to the technology of relationships between goals and tools. Such relations 
determine the scope of rational economic policy. Neglecting them will have unintended consequences in terms of 
economic policy. Their reason is the existence of limited knowledge about the main cause-effect relationships. The 
cause-effect relationships often disappear from view, due to the following reasons:    
 Many other processes are “involved” between tools and goals; 
 The purpose of the tool changes based on the impacts that often follow the reaction of private individuals as 
a result of using the tool; 
 It takes a certain time for all the effects of the private sector's response to the goal to end. 
         These difficulties are of particular importance in terms of stabilization policies. The Keynesian model allows us 
to define them clearly. If the goal is to increase GDP and estimate government spending growth, then in addition to 
having a direct impact on the goal, it is necessary to consider other processes (including foreign trade) in the money 
and commodity markets. The result is that the multiplier effect is weakened. Difficulties in the current money supply 
conditions imply an increase in consumer spending, which in turn is a direct result of an increase in government 
spending. The additional impact on revenue-related revenue is weakening in the long run. The reason for this can be 
(leakage), which is ongoing: with an increase in savings, as well as the negative effects of income taxation and an 
increase in imports. This is usually compounded by the negative impact that reducing investment costs has on 
cartoon effects. The process is further deepened when the demand for transaction-stimulated income increases. Even 
when the economy is in equilibrium and consumer behavior (the function of consumption) involves delayed 
reactions, a third difficulty arises. Periodic analysis covers only part of economic processes, but the point is that the 
latency of reactions in subsequent periods is influenced by the variability of instruments. The dosing of economic 
policy measures may be appropriate only for the current period. At the same time it is possible to use it in the 
intermediate period in an overdose. 
         When using this or that instruments, in addition to the fact that it is necessary to make certain assessments, the 
dosage limits should also be taken into account. Such scopes are, first and foremost, technically conditioned. Of 
course, it is impossible to dose all the instruments with equal accuracy. In this context, we must keep in mind the 
difference between qualitative and quantitative instruments. A qualitative instrument is labor law, a law against an 
extreme measure - a cartel ban, or unfair competition. Quantitative instruments are tax rate and interest rate, state 
investment costs or interest payment when withdrawing promissory notes. Dosage limits set by national law or 
international treaties are particularly important. They usually limit the scope of economic policy makers. An example 
of how the dosing of instruments is restricted at the international level is the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which imposes restrictions on member states in the field of foreign trade. An example of conformity to the system is 
the rules for dosing instruments, which are guaranteed by the Constitution. Property has such constitutional 
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guarantees. In this case, it is implied that the transfer of private property to public ownership is restricted. This 
situation is consistent with the prevailing view of law, according to which the socialization of property is permissible 
only in exceptional cases (although it is still permissible). 
         The problem of evaluation in terms of the use of economic policy instruments is related to the problem of 
dosing. This problem can be considered only when: 1) the instrument of assessment is as accurately dosed as 
possible; 2) Both the impact on the target and the accompanying impact vary with the degree of dosing and both 
short-term and long-term impacts are assessed; 3) The costs of using the product are not reduced to fixed costs, but it 
also varies according to the quality of dosing and its total amount is known. Based on these extremely simplified 
guidelines, it is possible to distinguish the following degrees of dosing: 
 The instrument is optimally dosed when the possibility of its otherwise dosing would not have brought 
greater benefit; 
 The dosage quality of the instrument is absolutely insufficient when the costs of its use exceed the obtained 
benefits. In general, the benefits will increase if we significantly increase the dose of the instrument; 
 The instrument is relatively insufficiently or highly sufficiently dosed, when it is true that the total benefit 
of its use exceeds the total cost, but more or less dosing would be much more beneficial; 
 The instrument is absolutely overdosed when the total costs outweigh the overall benefits and positive 
benefits are expected only in the case of its smaller dose. 
As seen, it is impossible to determine accurately the degree of dosing of a particular instrument of the economic 
policy. We are dealing with an absolutely insufficient dosage of the instrument when it does not affect the purpose, 
while the funds for its use are spent without any return. Minimal dosing is necessary when we need to avoid the 
reaction (threshold) of individuals to which this measure applies. The existence of such a threshold suggests that the 
costs associated with changing the economic aspirations of private entities will be very high. To be more precise, this 
implies overcoming the reactions of the subjects to the variability of the drafted economic-and-political indicators. 
Such costs are measured according to the results achieved and / or the costs that could have been avoided. Such a 
barrier may arise as a result of the difference between the expected benefit of the reaction and the costs associated 
with the subsidy. There may also be some differences in tax rates and interest rate variations. An example of this is 
the so-called minor taxes, which take into account both legislative, governmental and private expenditures, as well as 
tax revenues. 
         We are dealing with relative and / or absolutely insufficient dosing when the introduction of economic policy 
measures does not take into account or neglect the plans of the private sector of the economy. Such a possibility is 
clearly evidenced by the growing resistance to taxes. When assessing the conformity of a tool  to a goal, it is 
necessary to consider both active (tax evasion or negligence) and passive forms of resistance (declining efficiency). 
The result of such inaccurate dosing is, for example, the illegal economy as part of the shadow economy.  
         Relative and / or absolutely insufficient dosing when using the product can lead to the absence of long-term 
effects. In this case, the short-term preferred ratio between benefits and costs will be reversed in the long run. Such 
an instrument is counterproductive. We get the “boomerang effect” when economically developed countries, as 
producers of consumer goods, are faced with favorable conditions by the fact that their prices are fixed by products 
that are not affected by the cyclical fluctuations characteristic of the world market. In the short run, this could lead to 
an increase in the efficiency of producers if the price elasticity of consumer goods is relatively low. In the long run, it 
is possible for the boomerang effect to manifest itself in the form that implies (under other things being equal) that 
consumer goods are easy to manufacture and not produced using high technology. Consequently, other developing 
countries are also involved in the production process, resulting in falling world prices and production efficiency. The 
same effect occurs when the quantity of supply is determined by considering the long-term elasticity of prices. In 
terms of demand - it is possible that high prices will have a positive impact on the subsidy and return processes. 
Therefore, the elasticity of demand to prices increases.  
         Another case of relative and / or absolute overdose occurs when the long-term effects of the instrument are 
defined as a total impact and an increase in dosage is associated with it, which is a counterproductive measure. When 
in the short run the conjuncture does not have a significant impact on the implementation of the program, there is a 
temptation to "improve" the existing program with another program. When delays in the outcome become the cause 
of short-term and weak reactions, as it is in the case of all cybernetic systems, there is often a danger of “excessive” 
management. Close to this possibility is another problem called the “Total effect” (Tuchtfeldt, 1970a, p. 732). This 
means that the instruments of economic policy are not dealing with a situation free from intervention, but with action 
with other previously adopted measures. Therefore, over time, different types of assistance become necessary to help 
maintain and / or adapt the structure to an obvious or hidden purpose. Added to this are numerous measures related 
to distribution policy, the accompanying impacts of which (information security system) hinder mobility. They can 
be avoided by measures with the same effects (barriers to relocation within production) agreed upon in advance by 
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the parties to the labor market. Mistakes in competition policy (measures to restrict trade) do great damage to the 
function of compliance with competition and its development. The “Total effect” of such measures is that the 
possibility of free structural change is limited. It manifests itself in the closure of enterprises and structural 
unemployment, rather than the redistribution of sectoral and regional resources. For some individuals, the “Total 
effect” of past interventions is the same as denying market coordination and structural change. It therefore does not 
see the need to re-evaluate costs and benefits in relation to a particular measure and to replace the measure with 
another measure. 
         And finally, inaccurate dosing is often caused by the variability of the planned economic policy data when a 
particular economic policy action plan requires the possibly highest ability to adapt to the market. This means that 
the necessary knowledge about compliance reactions is reassessed. If we continue to evaluate measures based on 
existing management knowledge, we should still expect dosing-related errors. 
         Different degrees of dosing are associated with a particular instrument. Therefore, in the case of optimal doses, 
nothing is said yet about the comparison between different means. This includes all other means by which the same 
goal can be achieved in principle. Such a comparison is appropriate when competitive measures are hierarchically 
ranked according to their overall usefulness. It is about the benefits that can be achieved at any time in case of 
optimal dosing. Such an assessment is always partial, since it does not take into account the possibility of 
combinations between instruments. From such combinations, the one that promises the most benefits should be given 
preference. Evaluation of an instrument  without considering such combinations can never lead to the desired result, 
to the optimal dosing of the measure. Demands for management knowledge and necessary assessments are 
increasing. This occurs when, instead of a partial assessment of an event, it becomes necessary to evaluate 
combinations of separate competing means. It should be implemented by comparing more or less means and purpose 
systems and / or economic policy programs. In this regard, the problem arises as to whether it is possible to 
formulate an economic policy of the order of action. 
         Economic policy bodies face the problem of delays, both in their sphere of influence (endogenous delays) and 
outside this sphere (exogenous delays). In addition, the action of the tools is characterized by common delays that 
follow the process of its use from beginning to end. The economic policy instance is characterized by a general delay 
that is related to cognition and often takes the form of an exogenous delay. It consists of: 
 A delay in perception, the reason being that it becomes possible to observe economic policy errors after a 
certain period of time; 
 Communication delays, which means that it takes some time to prepare and transmit error information. 
The second group of events is the delays inherent in economic policy instance:  
 The reason for delaying the diagnosis is that some time is needed to evaluate the information received and 
analyze the errors; 
 Planning delays mean that the development of an economic policy program takes some time; 
 Delaying a decision is also related to the time it takes to assess action options. 
         Delays in implementation manifest themselves in the process of implementing the program when the legal 
framework is being created. 
         The use of instrument and the information about it changes the positions of private entities and causes them to 
react differently. The resulting delays take the form of external delays and consist of the following elements: 
 Regarding the progress of the process,  a delay that occurs after the event, which manifests itself after the 
end of the event and before the first impact on the goal; 
 Process-induced delays which are caused by the fact that the  post-process  delays do  not occur  
immediately. They appear after a certain period  of time, before the overall impact on the target takes place. 
 
         IV. CONCLUSION 
 
         A particular problem with dosing arises when there is a delay in the application or impact of economic policy 
instruments. From an economic point of view, delays are always caused by technical, institutional and behavioral 
conflicts. Technical delay means that the use of the instrument will have an effect after some time. Behavioral delay 
refers to the situation that involves the preparation and execution of a decision. This process is preconditioned by the 
delay in the behavior of economic policy makers. 
         The delays inherent in economic policy instances consist of different elements than the similar delays inherent 
in the private sector. In the case of the private sector, it concerns the reactions of private entities to economic policy 
volatility. 
         In the case of economic policy instances - delays in cognition, instances and impacts arise before the use of the 
instrument is followed by impact. It is therefore necessary to make predictions that provide information about the 
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current state of the economic policy problem at a given moment of time. Ignoring this difficulty or misjudging it in 
the context of economic policy conjuncture means that the stabilization measure has failed. 
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